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Abstract In this paper we propose an extension of Defeasible Logic to represent
and compute three concepts of defeasible permission. In particular, we discuss dif-
ferent types of explicit permissive norms that work as exceptions to opposite obli-
gations. Moreover, we show how strong permissions can be represented both with,
and without introducing a new consequence relation for inferring conclusions from
explicit permissive norms. Finally, we illustrate how a preference operator appli-
cable to contrary-to-duty obligations can be combined with a new operator repre-
senting ordered sequences of strong permissions which derogate from prohibitions.
The logical system is studied from a computational standpoint and is shown to have
liner computational complexity.
1. Introduction
The concept of permission plays an important role in many normative domains in that
it may be crucial in characterising notions such as those of authorisation and derogation
[11,30,33]. For example, sometimes it may happen that we mistakenly drive to a building
site, or a road-work restricted area, with signs out saying “No admittance. Authorised
personnel only”. Or consider when we subscribe to an on-line sale agreement accepting
to enter our personal data on the condition that this information is only used for shipping,
and other necessary purposes to communicate with us or deliver the products to us. In
both cases, a permission (to enter a restricted area or to use our personal data) is stated
as an exception to a general prohibition.
Despite this fact, the concept of permission is still elusive in this field of literature
and has not been extensively investigated in deontic logic as the notion of obligation.
For a long time, deontic logicians mostly viewed permission as the dual of obligation:
Pa ≡ ¬O¬a. This view is unsatisfactory, as it hardly allows us to grasp the meaning of
examples like the ones previously mentioned. For this, and other reasons, the attempt to
reduce permissions to duals of obligations has been criticised (see [2,1]).
One important distinction that has traditionally contributed to a richer account of
this concept is the one between weak (or negative) and strong (or positive) permission
[35]. The former corresponds to saying that some a is permitted if ¬a is not provable
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as mandatory. In other words, something is allowed by a code iff(only when) it is not
prohibited by that code. At least when dealing with unconditional obligations, the notion
of weak permission is trivially equivalent to the dual of obligation [25].
The latter concept of strong permission is more complicated, as it amounts to saying
that some a is permitted by a code iff such a code explicitly states that a is permitted.
It follows that a strong permission is not derived from the absence a prohibition, but
is explicitly formulated in a permissive norm. The complexities of this concept depend
on the fact that, besides “the items that a code explicitly pronounces to be permitted,
there are others that in some sense follow from the explicit ones”. The problem is hence
“to clarify the inference from one to the other” [25, p. 391–2]. For example, if some b
logically follows from a, which is strongly permitted, can we say that b is also strongly
permitted?
Features such as the distinction between strong and weak permission show the multi-
faceted nature of permission and permissive norms, which has been overlooked by most
logicians for a long time. Nevertheless, some exceptions have recently offered signifi-
cant contributions to the logical understanding of permission [25,9,10,12,33,32]. These
contributions can be roughly summarised into the following points:
• despite some scepticism [28,27] and critical remarks [3,2] (a discussion of this re-
lated work can be found in Section 7), the distinction between weak and strong per-
mission seems to be needed, otherwise it is rather hard to account for the fact that
certain permissions make sense because they explicitly derogate to existing prohibi-
tions while other permissions are not explicit and occur precisely because opposite
prohibitions do not exist;
• we may have different types of strong permissions (specifically permissions that
logically follow from explicit permissive norms), according to whether
* we statically determine what is actually permitted given what is obligatory and
what is explicitly permitted;
* we dynamically determine “the limits on what may be prohibited without vio-
lating static permissions” [9];
• especially in the law, strong permissions state exceptions to obligations [8]: indeed,
derogating with a permission, for example, to a general prohibition to use private
protected data provides an exception to such a prohibition;
• strong permissions make sense even when any incompatible prohibitions are not in
the legal system; permissions have a dynamic behaviour and prevent future prohibi-
tions from holding in general, or applying to specific contexts [13].
This paper moves from the above points with the specific purpose of studying the
different conceptual and computational aspects of weak and strong permissions. More
precisely, the current contribution works in the following directions:
Permissions and defeasibility. The concept of permission exhibits strong connections
with the idea of defeasibility. Indeed, an example of a natural way to capture strong
permissions acting as exceptions to obligations is the one where permissions rebut
the conclusions of incompatible prescriptive norms [25,9,17,33] or undercut them
(i.e., challenge an inference rule of an argument supporting an opposite obligation)
[10]).
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Permissions and preferences. Sometimes explicit derogations of (existing or possible)
prohibitions can be ranked according to some preference orderings. In other words,
given any prescriptive norm prohibiting a, more derogations to this norm can be
stated and ranked in a certain preference sequence. This situation may occur in do-
mains such as the law, where for instance the lawmaker, when imposing duties for
citizens, establishes conditions to lessen the effect of violating such duties to differ-
ent degrees, or exempt people to comply with the duties. We will study these mech-
anisms and see that ordered sequences of strong permissions, derogating or making
exceptions to prohibitions, have interesting similarities with ordered sequences of
contrary-to-duty obligations [14,15]. This is a specific novelty of our contribution,
as such sequences regard permissions (i.e., exceptions) which are not necessarily
incompatible with each other.
Permissions and computation. If, as we have mentioned, the concept of permission is
mostly overlooked in literature, being that its computational treatment is basically
neglected. To the best of our knowledge, no work in deontic logic has extensively
explored the computational complexity of reasoning about different types of per-
mission. Here, we will attempt a first analysis of the problem in the context of a
modal extension of Defeasible Logic [5]. Modal Defeasible Logic is a computation-
ally efficient logical framework able to capture various aspects of non-monotonic
and modal reasoning, as well as the defeasible character of permissive norms, and
recently a possible-world semantics for it has been proposed [18]. We will study how
to compute weak and strong permissions with and without introducing a new non-
monotonic consequence relation for permission. The choice of Defeasible Logic is
motivated by the fact that it is very efficient. Also, the formal language of its (non-
modal) modulo is simple, thus allowing us to isolate the deontic aspects of permis-
sions and investigate their specific computational characteristics.
The layout of the paper is as follows. Section 2 introduces and informally discusses
three types of defeasible permission in Defeasible Logic. Section 3 presents the techni-
cal machinery and states coherency and consistency results of the proposed extension.
In Section 4 we develop the algorithmic means to state what is mandatory and what is
permitted in a given theory, along with the corresponding computational results in Sec-
tion 5. Section 6 discusses the system and illustrates how the logical framework pre-
sented in Section 3 is able to capture the three types of permission. Section 7 discusses
some related work and provides a summary of the paper.
2. Three concepts of permission
This section is meant to offer a brief and gentle introduction to our formal language
and logic, and to discuss three different types of permission and their relation with the
concept of normative defeasibility. Moreover, we illustrate the idea of preference over
permissions that explicitly derogate to prohibitions.
These aspects will be formally handled in Section 3. The whole discussion of the
computational aspects of permission in Defeasible Logic is postponed to Sections 4 and
5.
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2.1. Informal presentation of the logic
Let us summarise the basic logical intuitions behind our framework.
1. Permissive and prescriptive norms are represented by means of defeasible rules,
whose conclusions normally follow unless they are defeated by contrary evidence.
For example, the rule
Order ⇒O Pay
says that, if we send a purchase order, then we will be defeasibly obliged to pay; the
rule
Order,Creditor ⇒P ¬Pay
states that if we send an order, in general we are not obliged to pay if we are creditors
towards the vendor for the same amount.
2. Rules introduce modalities: if we have the rule a ⇒O b and a holds, then we obtain
Ob. That is to say, in the scenario where conditions described by a hold, the obli-
gation of doing b is active as well. The advantage is that explicitly deriving modal
literals such as Ob adds expressive power to the language, since Ob may appear in
the antecedent of other rules, which can then be triggered.
3. For the sake of simplicity, modal literals can only occur in the antecedent of rules.
In other words, we do not admit nested modalities, i.e., rules such as a⇒O Pb. This
is in line with our idea that the applicability of rules labeled with modality✷ (where
✷ can be O for obligation or P for permission) is the condition for deriving literals
modalised with ✷.
4. The symbols O and P are not simple labels: they are modalities. O is non-reflexive1:
consequently, we do not have a conflict within the theory when ¬a is the case and
we derive that a is mandatory (Oa); this amounts to having a violation. The modality
P works in such a way that two rules for P supporting a and ¬a do not clash, but a
rule like ⇒P b attacks a rule such as ⇒O ¬b (and vice versa).
5. Like standard Defeasible Logic, our extension is able to establish the relative
strength of any rule (thus to solve rule conflicts) and has two types of attackable
rules: defeasible rules and defeaters. Defeaters in Defeasible Logic are a special kind
of rules: they are used to prevent conclusions but not to support them. For example,
the defeater
SpecialOrder,PremiumCustomer❀O ¬PayBy7Days
can prevent the derivation of the obligation for premium customers placing special
orders to pay within the deadline of 7 days, but cannot be used to directly derive any
conclusion.
2.2. Permissions and defeasibility
The above framework, though simple, allows us to express three basic types of permis-
sions as well as illustrate interesting connections with the idea of defeasibility.
1As it is well-known, in a non-reflexive modal logic ✷a does not imply a, where ✷ is a modal operator.
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Weak permission. A first way to define permissions in Defeasible Logic is by simply
considering weak permissions and stating that the opposite of what is permitted is not
provable as obligatory. Let us consider a normative system consisting of the following
two rules:
r1 : Park,Vehicle⇒O ¬Enter
r2 : Park,Emergency⇒O Enter.
Here the normative system does not contain any permissive norm. However, since Defea-
sible Logic is a sceptical non-monotonic logic, in case both r1 and r2 fire we neither con-
clude that it is prohibited nor that it is obligatory to enter, because we do not know which
rule is stronger. Hence, in this context, both ¬Enter and Enter are weakly permitted.
As already argued, this is the most direct way to define the idea of weak permission:
some q is permitted by a code iff q is not prohibited by that code. Accordingly, saying
that any literal q is weakly permitted corresponds to the failure of deriving¬q using rules
for O. Notice that, in Defeasible Logic, this does not amount to obtain ¬O¬q.
Explicit permissions are defeaters. In Defeasible Logic any rule can be used to prevent
the derivation of a conclusion. For instance, suppose there exists a norm that prohibits to
U-turn at traffic lights unless there is a “U-turn permitted” sign:
r1 : AtTrafficLight⇒O ¬Uturn
r2 : AtTrafficLight,UturnSign⇒O Uturn.
In this example we use a defeasible rule for obligation to block the prohibition to U-turn.
However, this is not satisfactory: if we do not know whether r2 is stronger than r1, then
the best we can say is that U-turn is weakly permitted. Furthermore, if r2 prevails over
r1, we derive that U-turn is obligatory.
Thus, there are good reasons to argue that defeaters for O are suitable to express
an idea of strong permission2. Explicit rules such as r : a❀O q state that a is a specific
reason for blocking the derivation of O¬q (but not for proving Oq). In other words,
this rule does not support any conclusion, but states that ¬q is deontically undesirable.
Consider this example:
r1 : Weekend,AirPollution⇒O ¬UseCar
r2 : Weekend,Emergency❀O UseCar.
Rule r1 states that on weekends it is forbidden to use private cars if a certain air pollution
level is exceeded. Defeater r2 is in fact an exception to r1, and so it seems to capture the
above idea that explicit permissive norms (especially in the law) provide exceptions to
obligations.
Explicit permissions using permissive rules. Another approach is based on introducing
specific rules for deriving permissions [25,9]. Let us consider the following situation:
r1 : Weekend,AirPollution⇒O ¬UseCar
r′2 : Emergency⇒P UseCar.
As r2 in the previous scenario, r′2 looks like an exception to r1. The apparent difference
between r2 and r′2 is that the latter is directly used to prove that the use of the car is
permitted (PUseCar) in case of emergencies. The question is: does it amount to a real
difference?
2The idea of using defeaters to introduce permissions was introduced in [19].
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Although r2 is a defeater, it is specifically used to derive the strong permission to
use the car, like r′2. In addition, rules such as r′2 do not attack other permissive rules, but
are in conflict only with rules for obligation intended to prove the opposite conclusion.
This precisely holds for defeaters.
Moreover, let us suppose to have the defeater s : a❀P b. Does s attack a rule like
⇒P ¬b?
If this is the case, s would be close to an obligation. The fact that Pb does not attack
P¬b makes it pointless for s to introduce defeaters for P. But, if this is not the case, s
could only attack ⇒O ¬b, thus being equivalent to s′ : a❀O b.
Therefore, although it is admissible to have defeaters, we do not need to distinguish
defeaters for O from those for P. One way to mark the difference between❀ and ⇒P is
by stating that only the latter rule type admits ordered sequences of strong permissions
in the head of a rule, which are supposed to derogate or make exceptions to prohibitions.
This matter will be discussed in the next subsection.
2.3. Permissions, obligations, and preferences
The introduction of ordered sequences of strong permissions in the head of a rule, which
derogate or make exceptions to prohibitions, can be logically modelled by enriching the
formal language and following these guidelines:
1. In many domains, such as the law, norms often specify mandatory actions to be
taken in case of their violation. In general, obligations in force after the violation
of some other obligations correspond to contrary-to-duty (CTD) obligations. These
constructions affect the formal characterisation of compliance since they identify
situations that are not ideal, but still acceptable. A compact representation of CTDs
may resort to the non-boolean connective ⊗ [14]: a formula like x ⇒O a⊗ b means
that, if x is the case, then a is obligatory, but if the obligation a is not fulfilled, then
the obligation b is activated and becomes in force until it is satisfied, or violated.
2. Concepts introduced at point 1 can be extended to permissive rules with the sub-
scripted arrow ⇒P by introducing the non-boolean connective ⊙ for sequences of
permissions. As in the case of⊗, given a rule like⇒P a⊙b, we can proceed through
the⊙-chain to obtain the derivation of Pb. However, permissions cannot be violated,
and consequently it does not make sense to obtain Pb from⇒P a⊙b and ¬a. In this
case, the reason to proceed in the chain is rather that the normative system allows us
to prove O¬a. Hence, ⊙ still establishes a preference order among strong permis-
sions and, in case the opposite obligation is in force, another permission holds. This
is significant especially when strong permissions are exceptions to obligations.
In this paper we take a neutral approach as to whether ordered sequences of obliga-
tions or permissions are either given explicitly, or inferred from other rules. However, we
point out that normative documents often explicitly contains provision with such struc-
tures. A clear example of this is provided by the Australian “National Consumer Credit
Protection Act 2009” (Act No. 134 of 2009) which is structured in such a way that for
every section establishing an obligation or a prohibition, the penalties for violating the
provision are given in the section itself.
Example 1 (National Consumer Credit Protection Act 2009). Section 29 (Prohibition
on engaging in credit activities without a licence) of the act recites:
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(1) A person must not engage in a credit activity if the person does not hold a licence
authorising the person to engage in the credit activity.
Civil penalty: 2,000 penalty units.
[. . . ]
Criminal penalty: 200 penalty units, or 2 years imprisonment, or both.
This norm can be represented as
r1 :⇒O ¬CreditActivity⊗ 2000CivilPenaltyUnits
r2 : CreditLicence⇒P CreditActivity
where r2 > r1. The first rules state that in absence of other information a person is for-
bidden to engage in credit activities (O¬CreditActivity), and then the second rule estab-
lish an exception to the prohibition, or in other terms it recites a condition under which
such activities are permitted. The section then continues by giving explicit exceptions
(permissions) to the prohibition to engage in credit activity, even without a valid licence.
Sequences of permissions are a natural fit for expressions like “the subject is autho-
rised, in order of preference, to do the following: (list)” or “the subject is entitled, in order
of preference, to one of the following: (list)”. This is illustrated in the next example.
Example 2 (U.S. Copyright Act). A concrete instance of sequences of permissions is
given by Section 504(c)(1) (Remedies for infringement: Damages and profits) of the U.S.
Copyright Act (17 USC §504).
Except as provided by clause (2) of this subsection, the copyright owner may elect, at
any time before final judgment is rendered, to recover, instead of actual damages and
profits, an award of statutory damages for all infringements involved in the action,
with respect to any one work, for which any one infringer is liable individually, or
for which any two or more infringers are liable jointly and severally, in a sum of not
less than $750 or more than $30,000 as the court considers just. [. . . ]
The above provision can be modelled as
infringment,beforeJudgment⇒P ActualDamages⊙ StatutoryDamages
The above rendering of the textual provision is based on the interpretation of the term
‘instead’, which suggests that the copyright owners are entitled by default the award of
the actual damages and profits, but they may elect to recover statutory damages, which
is then the second option if exercised by the relevant party.3
As we have just seen, chains of obligations are appropriate to capture the obligations
and the penalties related to them. Furthermore, this kind of structure has been success-
fully used for applications in the area of business process compliance [21]. In a situation
governed by the rule ⇒O a⊗ b and where ¬a and b hold, the norm has been complied
with (even if to a lower degree than if we had a). On the contrary, if we had two rules
⇒O a and ¬a ⇒O b, then the first norm would have been violated, while the second
would have been complied with. But in overall, the whole case would be not compliant
[20].
3Here we speak of entitlements or rights. A right is a permission on one party (in this case the copyright
owner) generating an obligation on another party (in this case the infringer). For a more detailed discussion on
the concept of right see [30].
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Consider the following example:
r1 : Invoice⇒O PayWithin7days
r2 : OPayWithin7days,¬PayWithin7days⇒O Pay5%Interest
r3 : OPay5%Interest,¬Pay5%Interest⇒O Pay10%Interest.
What happens if a customer violates both the obligation to pay within 7 days after the
invoice and the obligation to pay the 5% of interest, but she pays the total amount plus the
10% of interest? In the legal perspective the customer should be still compliant, but in this
representation contract clauses r1 and r2 have been violated. However, if we represent
the whole scenario with the single rule
Invoice⇒O PayBy7days⊗Pay5%Interest⊗Pay10%Interest,
then the rule is not violated, and the customer is compliant with the contract.
Even when the text of legal provisions does not explicitly have this form, there are
cases where the joint interpretation of several legal provisions still leads to formulate
applicable norms with orders among derogations.
Example 3 (Formal equality and affirmative action). Art. 3, 1st paragraph, of the Italian
constitution ensures formal equality of citizens (in fact, all individuals) before the law,
namely, an equal legal treatment for everybody:
All citizens have equal social dignity and are equal before the law, without distinction
of sex, race, language, religion, political opinion, personal and social conditions.
[. . . ]
This general principle can be sometimes derogated, for example, when derogations are
meant “to remove those obstacles of an economic or social nature which constrain the
freedom and equality of citizens” (art. 3, 2nd par.). In fact, one may argue that permit-
ting (which is different from imposing as mandatory) the adoption of affirmative action
policies in favour of women (e.g., introducing quotas for women in politics and the job
market) is a flexible legal measure to remove some of those obstacles. Now, suppose a
quota for women is guaranteed in public institutions in hiring and promoting employ-
ees, but another similar derogation can be applied to disabled people. Imagine that, in
a specific case, it is not possible to apply both derogations (for example, this would lead
to exceeding the number of jobs available) and so we have to choose to hire a woman
or a disabled man. In absence of any further legal provision, one possible solution is to
balance both options with respect to the specific facts X of the case, thus ranking, in a
rule r, these options in order of preference, given the facts X (on balancing, see [4,31]).
For instance, if disabled men should be favoured over non-disabled women (because dis-
ability in this case reinforces a more serious discrimination or disadvantage) then r is
the following:
r : X ⇒P Hire Disabled Men⊙Hire NonDisabled Women
The reason why we should still keep as a second option Hire NonDisabled Women de-
pends on the fact that we can draw only defeasibly the permission of Hire Disabled Men.
Indeed, we have only considered art. 3 of the Italian constitution but other legal pro-
visions or factual reasons could block this conclusion. For example, suppose that the
disabled person applying for the job was some years earlier convicted of the crime of
belonging to a mafia organisation, while the law prohibits in general and without excep-
tions for public institutions to hire people who committed that crime. Or imagine that,
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in the meantime, the disabled man has withdrawn his request for a job. In both cases,
despite X occurs, the first option does not hold and, all things considered, the second one
can be applied in order to derogate to art. 3, 1st par., of the Italian constitution.
3. Defeasible Deontic Logic with strong permission
This section begins by introducing the language adopted to formalise obligations and
strong permissions in DL, and describing the inferential mechanism in the form of proof
conditions defining the logic. Finally, we show that the proposed formalisation enjoys
properties appropriate to model the notion of strong permission. We will proceed incre-
mentally: this section, as well as Section 4, works only with obligations and strong per-
missions expressed by rules for P. In Section 6 we will show how weak permissions and
strong permissions based on defeaters can be easily captured in the framework.
We consider a logic whose language is defined as follows.
Definition 1 (Language). Let PROP be a set of propositional atoms, MOD = {O,P} the
set of modal operators where O is the modality for the obligation and P for permission.
• The set Lit = PROP∪{¬p | p ∈ PROP} denotes the set of literals.
• The complementary of a literal q is denoted by ∼q; if q is a positive literal p, then
∼q is ¬p, and if q is a negative literal ¬p, then ∼q is p.
• The set of modal literals is ModLit = {✷l,¬✷l | l ∈ Lit, ✷ ∈MOD}.
We introduce two preference operators, ⊗ for obligations and ⊙ for permissions, and
we will use ⊘ when we refer to one of them generically. These operators are used to
build chains of preferences, called ⊘-expressions. The formation rules for well-formed
⊘-expressions are:
(a) every literal l ∈ Lit is an ⊘-expression;
(b) if A is an ⊗-expression, B is an⊙-expression and c1, . . . ,ck ∈ Lit, then A⊗c1⊗·· ·⊗
ck is an⊗-expression, B⊙c1⊙·· ·⊙ck is an⊙-expression, A⊙B is an⊘-expression;
(c) every ⊗-expression and ⊙-expression is an ⊘-expression;
(d) nothing else is an ⊘-expression.
In addition we stipulate that ⊗ and ⊙ obey the following properties:
1. a⊘ (b⊘ c) = (a⊘ b)⊘ c (associativity);
2. ⊘ni=1ai = (⊘
k−1
i=1 ai)⊘ (⊘
n
i=k+1ai) where there exists j such that a j = ak and j < k
(duplication and contraction on the right).
Given an ⊘-expression A, the length of A is the number of literals in it. Given an ⊘-
expression A⊘b⊘C (where A and C can be empty), the index of b is the length of A⊘b.
We also say that b appears at index n in A⊘ b if the length of A⊘ b is n.
We adopt the standard Defeasible Logic definitions of strict rules, defeasible rules,
and defeaters [5]. However for the sake of simplicity, and to better focus on the non-
monotonic aspects that Defeasible Logic offers, in the remainder we use only defeasible
rules and defeaters. In addition, we have to take the modal operators into account.
Definition 2 (Rules). Let Lab be a set of arbitrary labels. Every rule is of the type
r : A(r) →֒C(r)
where
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1. r ∈ Lab is the name of the rule;
2. A(r) = {a1, . . . ,an}, the antecedent (or body) of the rule, is the set of the premises of
the rule (alternatively, it can be understood as the conjunction of all the literals in
it). Each ai is either a literal, or a modal literal;
3. →֒∈ {⇒✷,❀} denotes the type of the rule. If →֒ is ⇒✷, the rule is a defeasible rule,
while if →֒ is❀, the rule is a defeater. The subscript ✷ ∈ MOD in defeasible rules
represents the modality introduced by the rule itself: the mode of a rule tells us what
kind of conclusion we obtain from the rule. As we argued in Section 2, we do not
need to label❀ with any modality;
4. C(r) is the consequent (or head) of the rule, which is an ⊘-expression. Two con-
straints apply on the consequent of a rule: (a) if →֒ is❀, then C(r) is a single literal;
(b) if ✷= P, then C(r) must be an ⊙-expression.
Given a set of rules R, we will use the following abbreviations for specific subsets of
rules:
• Rde f denotes the set of all defeaters in the set R;
• R[q,n] is the set of rules where q appears at index n in the consequent. The set of
(defeasible) rules where q appears at any index n is denoted by R[q];
• R✷ with ✷ ∈MOD denotes the set of all rules in R introducing modality ✷;
• RO[q,n] is the set of (defeasible) rules where q appears at index n and the operator
preceding it is⊗ for n > 1 or the mode of the rule is O for n = 1. The set of (defeasi-
ble) rules where q appears at any index n satisfying the above constraints is denoted
by RO[q];
• similarly RP[q,n] is the set of rules where q appears at index n, and the operator pre-
ceding it is ⊙ for n > 1 or the mode of the rule is P for n = 1. The set of (defeasible)
rules where q appears at any index n satisfying the above constraints is denoted by
RP[q].
Definition 3. A Defeasible Theory is a structure D = (F,R,>), where F, the set of facts,
is a set of literals and modal literals, R is a set of rules and >, the superiority relation,
is a binary relation over R.
A theory corresponds to a normative system, i.e., a set of norms which are modelled by
rules. The superiority relation is used for conflicting rules, i.e., rules whose conclusions
are complementary literals, in case both rules fire. Notice that we do not impose any
restriction on the superiority relation: it is just a binary relation determining the relative
strength of two rules.
Definition 4. A proof P in a defeasible theory D is a linear sequence P(1) . . .P(n) of
tagged literals in the form of +∂✷q and−∂✷q with✷∈MOD, where P(1) . . .P(n) satisfy
the proof conditions given in Definitions 8–11.
The tagged literal +∂✷q means that q is defeasibly provable in D with modality✷, while
−∂✷q means that q is defeasibly refuted with modality✷. The initial part of length i of a
proof P is denoted by P(1..i).
The first thing to do is to define when a rule is applicable or discarded. A rule is
applicable for a literal q if q occurs in the head of the rule, all non-modal literals in
the antecedent are given as facts and all the modal literals have been defeasibly proved
(with the appropriate modalities). On the other hand, a rule is discarded if at least one
of the modal literals in the antecedent has not been proved (or is not a fact in the case
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of non-modal literals). However, as literal q might not appear as the first element in an
⊘-expression in the head of the rule, some additional conditions on the consequent of
rules must be satisfied. Defining when a rule is applicable or discarded is essential to
characterise the notion of provability for obligations (±∂O) and permissions (±∂P).
Definition 5. A rule r∈R[q, j] such that C(r) = c1⊗·· ·⊗cl−1⊙cl⊙·· ·⊙cn is applicable
for literal q at index j, with 1≤ j < l, in the condition for ±∂O iff
(1) for all ai ∈ A(r):
(1.1) if ai = Ol then +∂Ol ∈ P(1..n);
(1.2) if ai = ¬Ol then −∂Ol ∈ P(1..n);
(1.3) if ai = Pl then +∂Pl ∈ P(1..n);
(1.4) if ai = ¬Pl then −∂Pl ∈ P(1..n);
(1.5) if ai = l ∈ Lit then l ∈ F, and
(2) for all ck ∈C(r), 1≤ k < j, +∂Ock ∈ P(1..n) and (ck 6∈ F or ∼ck ∈ F).
Conditions (1.1)–(1.5) represent the requirements on the antecedent as informally de-
scribed above; condition (2) on the head of the rule states that each element ck prior to q
must be derived as an obligation, and a violation of such obligation has occurred.
Definition 6. A rule r∈R[q, j] such that C(r) = c1⊗·· ·⊗cl−1⊙cl⊙·· ·⊙cn is applicable
for literal q at index j, with l ≤ j ≤ n in the condition for ±∂P iff
(1) for all ai ∈ A(r):
(1.1) if ai = Ol then +∂Ol ∈ P(1..n);
(1.2) if ai = ¬Ol then −∂Ol ∈ P(1..n);
(1.3) if ai = Pl then +∂Pl ∈ P(1..n);
(1.4) if ai = ¬Pl then −∂Pl ∈ P(1..n);
(1.5) if ai = l ∈ Lit then l ∈ F, and
(2) for all ck ∈C(r), 1≤ k < l, +∂Ock ∈ P(1..n) and (ck 6∈ F or ∼ck ∈ F), and
(3) for all ck ∈C(r), l ≤ k < j, −∂Pck ∈ P(1..n).
The only difference with respect to±∂O is the presence of an additional condition, stating
that all permissions prior to q must be refuted (condition (3)).
Definition 7. A rule r ∈R[q, j] such that C(r) = c1⊗·· ·⊗cl−1⊙cl⊙·· ·⊙cn is discarded
for literal q at index j, with 1≤ j ≤ n in the condition for ±∂O or ±∂P iff
(1) there exists ai ∈ A(r) such that
(1.1) if ai = Ol then −∂Ol ∈ P(1..n);
(1.2) if ai = ¬Ol then +∂Ol ∈ P(1..n);
(1.3) if ai = Pl then −∂Pl ∈ P(1..n);
(1.4) if ai = ¬Pl then +∂Pl ∈ P(1..n);
(1.5) if ai = l ∈ Lit then l 6∈ F, or
(2) there exists ck ∈C(r), 1≤ k < l, such that either −∂Ock ∈ P(1..n) or ck ∈ F, or
(3) there exists ck ∈C(r), l ≤ k < j, such that +∂Pck ∈ P(1..n).
In this case, condition (2) ensures that an obligation prior to q in the chain is not in force
or has already been fulfilled (thus, no reparation is required), while condition (3) states
that there exists at least one explicit derived permission prior to q.
We now introduce the proof conditions for ±∂O and ±∂P.
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Definition 8. The proof condition of defeasible provability for obligation is
+∂O: If P(n+ 1) = +∂Oq then
(1) Oq ∈ F or
(2.1) O∼q 6∈ F and ¬Oq 6∈ F and P∼q 6∈ F and
(2.2) ∃r ∈ RO[q, i] such that r is applicable for q, and
(2.3) ∀s ∈ R[∼q, j], either
(2.3.1) s is discarded, or either
(2.3.2) s ∈ RO and ∃t ∈ R[q,k] such that t is applicable for q and t > s, or
(2.3.3) s ∈ RP∪Rde f and ∃t ∈ RO[q,k] such that t is applicable for q and t > s.
To show that q is defeasibly provable as an obligation, there are two ways: (1) the obliga-
tion of q is a fact, or (2) q must be derived by the rules of the theory. In the second case,
three conditions must hold: (2.1) q does not appear as not obligatory as a fact, and ∼q is
neither provable as an obligation nor as a permission using the set of modal facts at hand;
(2.2) there must be a rule introducing the obligation for q which can apply; (2.3) every
rule s for ∼q is either discarded or defeated by a stronger rule for q. If s is an obligation
rule, then it can be counterattacked by any type of rule; if s is a defeater or a permission
rule, then only an obligation rule can counterattack it.
The strong negation of the above definition gives us the negative proof condition for
obligation. Notice that the strong negation of a formula is closely related to the function
that simplifies a formula by moving all negations to an inner most position in the resulting
formula, and replaces the positive tags with the respective negative tags, and the other
way around [6,17].
Definition 9. The proof condition of defeasible refutability for obligation is
−∂O: If P(n+ 1) =−∂Oq then
(1) Oq 6∈ F and either
(2.1) O∼q ∈ F or ¬Oq ∈ F or P∼q ∈ F or
(2.2) ∀r ∈ RO[q, i] either r is discarded for q, or
(2.3) ∃s ∈ R[∼q, j] such that
(2.3.1) s is applicable for ∼q, and
(2.3.2) if s ∈ RO then ∀t ∈ R[q,k], either t is discarded or t 6> s, and
(2.3.3) if s ∈ RP∪Rde f then ∀t ∈ RO[q,k], either t is discarded or t 6> s.
We now introduce and briefly explain the proof conditions for permission.
Definition 10. The proof condition of defeasible provability for permission is
+∂P: If P(n+ 1) = +∂Pq then
(1) Pq ∈ F or
(2.1) O∼q 6∈ F and ¬Pq 6∈ F and
(2.2) ∃r ∈ RP[q, i] such that r is applicable for q, and
(2.3) ∀s ∈ RO[∼q, j], either
(2.3.1) s is discarded for ∼q, or
(2.3.2) ∃t ∈ R[q,k] such that t is applicable for q and t > s.
This proof condition differs from its counterpart for obligation in two aspects: we allow
scenarios where both +∂Pq and +∂P∼q hold, but +∂O∼q must not hold (clause 2.1); any
applicable rule s supporting ∼q can be counterattacked by any type of rule t supporting
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q, as s must be an obligation rule, and permission rules can only be attacked by obligation
rules (clause 2.3).
As argued above, we define the negative proof condition for permission as the strong
negation of that for +∂P.
Definition 11. The proof condition of defeasible refutability for permission is
−∂P: If P(n+ 1) =−∂Pq then
(1) Pq 6∈ F and either
(2.1) O∼q ∈ F or ¬Pq ∈ F, or
(2.2) ∀r ∈ RP[q, i], either r is discarded, or
(2.3) ∃s ∈ RO[∼q, j] such that
(2.3.1) s is applicable for ∼q, and
(2.3.2) ∀t ∈ R[q,k], either t is discarded or t 6> s.
The logic resulting from the above proof conditions enjoys properties describing the
appropriate behaviour of the modal operators.
Definition 12. A Defeasible Theory D = (F,R,>) is consistent iff > is acyclic and F
does not contain pairs of complementary (modal) literals, that is if D does not contain
pairs like Ol and ¬Ol, Pl and ¬Pl, or l and ∼l. The theory D is O-consistent iff > is
acyclic and for any literal l, F does not contain any of the following pairs: Ol and O∼l,
Ol and P∼l.
As usual, given a Defeasible Theory D, we will use D ⊢ ±∂✷l iff there is a proof P
in D such that P(n) =±∂✷l for an index n.
Proposition 13. Let D be a consistent Defeasible Theory, and✷ ∈MOD. For any literal
l, it is not possible to have both D ⊢+∂✷l and D ⊢ −∂✷l.
Proof. It straightforwardly follows from the principle of strong negation proposed in
[6,17]: indeed, the negative proof tags proposed in this work are defined as the strong
negation of the positive ones.
The meaning of the above proposition is that it is not possible to prove that a literal is at
the same time obligatory and not obligatory, or permitted and not permitted.
Proposition 14. Let D be an O-consistent Defeasible Theory. For any literal l, it is not
possible to have both D ⊢+∂Ol and D ⊢+∂O∼l.
Proof. We split the proof in two cases: (i) at least one of Ol and O∼l is in F , and (ii)
none of them is in F .
For (i) the proposition immediately follows by the assumption of O-consistency.
Suppose that Ol ∈ F . Then clause (1) of +∂O holds for l. By O-consistency O∼l /∈ F ,
thus clause (1) of +∂O does not hold for∼l. Since Ol ∈ F , clause (2.1) of +∂O is always
falsified for ∼l, and the thesis is proved.
For (ii): First of all, it is easy to verify that no rule can be at the same time applicable
and discarded for the derivation of ±∂Ol(∼l). Then, since both +∂Ol and +∂O∼l hold,
we have that there are applicable obligation rules for both l and ∼l. This means that
clause (2.3.2) holds for both +∂Ol and +∂O∼l. Therefore, for every applicable rule for l
there is an applicable rule for∼l stronger than the rule for l, and symmetrically, for every
applicable rule for∼l there is an applicable rule for l stronger than the rule for∼l. Since
the set of rules in a theory is finite, the situation we have just described is possible only
13
if there is a cycle in the transitive closure of the superiority relation. Therefore, we have
a contradiction because the superiority relation is assumed to be acyclic (the transitive
closure of the relation does not contain cycles).
The meaning of the proposition is that no formula is both obligatory and forbidden at the
same time. However, the proposition does not hold for permission. It is possible to have
both the explicit permission of l and the explicit permission of ∼l.
The relationships between permissions and obligations are governed by the follow-
ing proposition:
Proposition 15. Let D be an O-consistent Defeasible Theory. For any literal l:
1. if D ⊢+∂Ol, then D ⊢ −∂O∼l;
2. if D ⊢+∂Ol, then D ⊢ −∂P∼l;
3. if D ⊢+∂Pl, then D ⊢ −∂O∼l.
Proof. 1. Let D be an O-consistent Defeasible Theory, and D ⊢ +∂Ol. Literal ∼l can
be in only one of the following mutually exclusive situations: (i) D ⊢ +∂O∼l; (ii) D ⊢
−∂O∼l; (iii) D 6⊢ ±∂O∼l. Proposition 14 allows us to exclude case (i) since D ⊢+∂Ol by
hypothesis. Situation (iii) denotes situations where there are loops in the theory involving
literal ∼l4, but inevitably this would affect also the provability of literal l, i.e., we would
not be able to give a proof for +∂Ol as well. This is in contradiction with the hypothesis;
thus, situation (ii) must be the case.
2. Let D be an O-consistent Defeasible Theory, and D ⊢+∂Ol. By definition of proof
conditions for +∂O, statements (1)–(2.3.3) hold.
If Ol ∈ F , then condition (2.1) of −∂P holds for ∼l. Furthermore, by O-consistency
of D, Ol ∈ F implies condition (1) of −∂P for ∼l, and we obtain the thesis.
Otherwise, from condition (2.2) of +∂O, conditions (2.3) and (2.3.1) of −∂P follow.
Again, we can iterate the same reasoning for condition (2.3.1) of +∂O implying condition
(2.2) of −∂P. It remains to consider conditions (2.3.2) and (2.3.3) of +∂O. In the first
case, the attacking rule s is an obligation rule, thus it is of no interest in this proof since
in condition (2.2) of −∂P we consider only permission rules. Thus, for the latter case,
we know there exists a rule t for obligation that is stronger than s, and this tuple of rules
(t,s) in condition (2.3.3) for +∂O is the equivalent but opposite tuple of the rules used in
condition (2.3.2) for−∂P. But, to analyse in an exhaustive way condition (2.3.2) of −∂P,
we have to take into consideration the whole set of rules S = {s1, . . . ,sn} for permission
leading to ∼l, against the set of rules T = {t1, . . . , tm} for obligation leading to l.5 For
each subset S′ of S, every rule s′ ∈ S′ is either discarded, or there exists a rule t ′ ∈ T that
is stronger (the existence of t ′ is guaranteed by the fact that +∂Ol holds by hypothesis).
We can now remove S′ from S (as it cannot be used for proving +∂P∼l), reducing the
number of elements in S. The iteration of this procedure eventually empties the set S
since the number of rules in D is finite, and the superiority relation is acyclic.
3. Let D be an O-consistent Defeasible Theory, and D⊢+∂Pl. By definition of proof
conditions for +∂P, statements (1) or (2.1)–(2.3.2) hold. The proof follows step by step
that of Part 2 of the proposition. Moreover, steps for conditions (1)–(2.2) are the mere
4For examples situations like O∼l ⇒O ∼l, where the proof conditions will generate a loop without intro-
ducing a proof.
5Notice that the rules in conditions (2.2) and (2.3.3) are different rules: they form a team that can defeat
teams of rules for the opposite.
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juxtaposition. It remains to analyse the interrelationship between condition (2.3) of +∂P
and conditions (2.3.2)–(2.3.3) of −∂O. Since condition (2.3) of +∂P takes into account
only rules for obligation which are systematically defeated with an analogous process of
rule elimination, thus conditions (2.3.2) and (2.3.3) of −∂O are satisfied.
The combination of Part 2 and 3 of Proposition 15 describes the consistency between
obligation and permission. Part 3 also gives the relationships between strong and weak
permission. As we discussed in Section 1, a weak permission is a permission obtained
from the failure to derive the opposite obligation. This means that we have the weak
permission of p when we have−∂O∼p, and Part 3 guarantees that we have it when +∂P p
holds.
We conclude this section showing how the logic developed hitherto works with the
example introduced at the end of Section 2.
Example. Let us recall the scenario reported at the end of Section 2, and formally ex-
plain the conclusions of the theory using applicability of rules and proof tags as de-
fined above. The primary obligation to call the ambulance is obtained (i.e., we derive
+∂OCallAmbulance), but the obligation is violated as ¬CallAmbulance ∈ F , making
r1 applicable for Help; rule r3 is applicable for literal ¬Help and could attack r1, but
r1 > r3, thus we have also +∂OHelp. Also CallFiremen is derived as an obligation
but it is violated, thus rule r2 is applicable for literal Extinguish in the condition for
+∂O. As +∂OHelp holds, r3 is applicable for ¬Extinguish, and r3 > r2, thus we derive
+∂P¬Extinguish.
4. Algorithms for defeasible extension
We now present procedures and algorithms apt to compute the extension of a finite De-
feasible Theory, i.e., a theory where the set of facts and rules is finite, in order to bound
the complexity of the logic introduced in the previous sections. The algorithms are based
on the algorithm proposed by Maher [23] to show that Defeasible Logic has linear com-
plexity; the algorithms also incorporate the notion of inferiorly defeated rules proposed
by [22] to handle directly the superiority relation.
This section is divided in three main parts. In the first part we give the formal def-
initions and introduce the notation adopted. The second part, which contains the main
body, describes the required computations: Algorithms 5 and 4 effectively compute the
defeasible extension of a Defeasible Theory given as an input, while Algorithms 1, 2,
and 3 are but auxiliary procedures that execute all the necessary operations due to any
modification of the extension. Each algorithm is followed by a technical explanation on
how it works. In the third part we present formal properties that are meant to prove the
computational results proposed in Section 5.
4.1. Notation for the algorithms
We introduce the notation relevant to our framework.
Given a Defeasible Theory D, HBD is the set of literals such that the literal or its
complement appears in D, where ‘appears’ means that it is a sub-formula of a modal lit-
eral occurring in the theory. The modal Herbrand Base of D is HB = {✷l|✷ ∈MOD, l ∈
HBD}. Accordingly, the extension of a Defeasible Theory is defined as follows.
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Definition 16. Given a Defeasible Theory D, the defeasible extension of D is defined as
E(D) = (+∂O,+∂P,−∂O,−∂P),
where±∂✷ = {l ∈HBD : D ⊢±∂✷l} with ✷ ∈MOD. We define two Defeasible Theories
D and D′ to be equivalent (in notation D ≡ D′) if they have the same extensions, i.e.,
E(D) = E(D′).
The next definition introduces two syntactical operations on the consequent of rules used
by the algorithms, whose meaning will be clear in the remainder.
Definition 17. Let c1 = a1⊘·· ·⊘al−1 and c2 = ai+1⊘·· ·⊘an be two (possibly empty)
⊘-expressions such that ai does not occur in them, and c = c1 ⊘ ai ⊘ c2 is an ⊘-
expression. Let r be a rule with form A(r) →֒ c. We define the operation of truncation of
the consequent c at ai as:
A(r) →֒ c!ai = A(r) →֒ c1⊘ ai.
We define the removal of ai from the consequent c, A(r) →֒ c⊖ ai, as:
A(r) →֒ c⊖ ai =


A(r)⇒O c1⊗ c2 if r is A(r)⇒O c1⊗ ai⊗ c2
A(r)⇒O c1⊙ c2 if r is A(r)⇒O c1⊗ ai⊙ c2
A(r)⇒✷∈MOD c1⊙ c2 if r is A(r)⇒✷∈MOD c1⊙ ai⊙ c2
A(r)⇒P c2 if r is A(r)⇒O ai⊙ c2
The next definition extends the concept of complement presented in Section 3 for modal
literals, and it is used to establish the logical connection among proved and refuted liter-
als in our framework.
Definition 18. We define the complement of a given literal l, denoted by ˜l, as:
1. If l ∈ Lit, then ˜l = {∼l};
2. If l = Om, then ˜l = {¬Om,O∼m,P∼m};
3. If l = ¬Om, then ˜l = {Om};
4. If l = Pm, then ˜l = {¬Pm,O∼m};
5. If l = ¬Pm, then ˜l = {Pm}.
Given ✷ ∈MOD, the sets ±∂✷ denote the global sets of defeasible conclusions (i.e., the
set of literals for which condition±∂✷ holds), while ∂±✷ are the corresponding temporary
sets. Notice that the complement of ¬Pm does not include Om (and vice versa) because
the failure to derive Pm cannot depend on the derivation of Om, but rather on the fact that
O∼m is the case.
4.2. Algorithms
We begin this subsection by reporting and explaining the three auxiliary procedures used
in the two main algorithms for the computation of the extension of a logic.
Algorithm 1 DISCARD performs all operations related to when −∂✷l holds for a given
literal l.
First of all, literal l is placed in the local set of refuted literals with modality ✷ (line
2). Furthermore, condition −∂✷l makes literal ¬✷l provable, therefore it can be safely
removed from all rules where it appears as an antecedent, being that its contribution
to a rule being applicable or refuted has already been established. Since l cannot be
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Algorithm 1 Discard
1: procedure DISCARD(l ∈ Lit,✷ ∈ {P,O})
2: ∂−
✷
← ∂−
✷
∪{l}
3: R←{A(r)\ {¬✷l} →֒C(r)| r ∈ R} \ {r ∈ R| ✷l ∈ A(r)}
4: >←> \{(r,s),(s,r) ∈> | ✷l ∈ A(r)}
5: HB←HB\ {✷l}
6: end procedure
proved with modality ✷, every rule containing ✷l in its body is discarded by clauses
(1.1) and (1.3) of Definition 7, and thus we can remove such rules without affecting
the conclusions that can be derived from the theory (line 3). In addition, we remove all
pairs involving the rules from the superiority relation (line 4), and ✷l from the modal
Herbrand Base (line 5).
Algorithms 2 MODIFYOBL and 3 MODIFYPERM behave in a very similar way: both
of them modify the theory to accommodate the positive derivation of a modal literal.
They only differ on the kind of rules they manipulate (obligation and permission rules,
respectively).
Algorithm 2 ModifyObl
1: procedure MODIFYOBL(l ∈ Lit)
2: ∂+O ← ∂+O ∪{l}
3: ∂−O ← ∂−O ∪{∼l}
4: ∂−P ← ∂−P ∪{∼l}
5: HB←HB\ {Ol,O∼l,P∼l}
6: if Ol 6∈ F then
7: R ←{A(r)\ {Ol,¬O∼l} →֒C(r)| r ∈ R} \ {r ∈ R| A(r)∩ O˜l 6= /0}
8: >←> \{(r,s),(s,r) ∈> | A(r)∩ O˜l 6= /0}
9: end if
10: R←{A(r) →֒C(r)⊖ l| r ∈ RO[l,n] for an index n}
11: R←{A(r) →֒C(r)⊖∼l| r ∈ RP[∼l,n] for an index n}
12: R←{A(r) →֒C(r)!∼l⊖∼l| r ∈ RO[∼l,n] for an index n}
13: end procedure
The input of both procedures is a literal l. As such, we add it to the corresponding set
of derived literals (line 2). Since D⊢+∂Ol implies D⊢−∂O∼l,−∂P∼l by Proposition 15
Part 1 and 2, and D ⊢+∂Pl implies D ⊢−∂O∼l by Proposition 15 Part 3, we also remove
∼l from the appropriate sets of refuted literals; then the modal literal along with the set
of its complementaries6 are removed from the Modal Herbrand Base (lines 3–5 and 3–4,
respectively). Lines 6–9 and 5–8, respectively, follow the same reasoning of line 3 in
Algorithm 1 DISCARD. Finally, the rules of the theory are modified on account of the
modality the literal is derived with as well as the conditions for the applicability of a rule
given in Definitions 5–7 (lines 10–12 and 9–10, respectively).
6Notice that we do not remove any negative modal literal from HB by definition of modal Herbrand Base.
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Algorithm 3 ModifyPerm
1: procedure MODIFYPERM(l ∈ Lit)
2: ∂+P ← ∂+P ∪{l}
3: ∂−O ← ∂−O ∪{∼l}
4: HB←HB\ {Pl,O∼l}
5: if Pl 6∈ F then
6: R ←{A(r)\ {Pl,¬O∼l} →֒C(r)| r ∈ R} \ {r ∈ R| A(r)∩ P˜l 6= /0}
7: >←> \{(r,s),(s,r) ∈> | A(r)∩ P˜l 6= /0}
8: end if
9: R←{A(r) →֒C(r)!∼l⊖∼l| r ∈ RO[∼l,n] for an index n}
10: R←{A(r) →֒C(r)!l| r ∈ RP[l,n] for an index n}
11: end procedure
Algorithm 4 CheckFacts
1: procedure CHECKFACTS
2: for l ∈ F do
3: R ←{A(r)\ {l} →֒C(r)| r ∈ R} \ {r ∈ R| A(r)∩ ˜l 6= /0}
4: >←> \{(r,s),(s,r) ∈> | A(r)∩ ˜l 6= /0}
5: if l ∈ Lit then
6: R← {A(r) →֒C(r)!l| r ∈ RO[l,n] for an index n}
7: end if
8: if l = Om then
9: MODIFYOBL(m)
10: end if
11: if l = ¬Om then
12: −∂O ←−∂O∪{m}
13: HB←HB\ {Om}
14: R← {A(r) →֒C(r)!m⊖m| r ∈ RO[m,n] for an index n}
15: end if
16: if l = Pm then
17: MODIFYPERM(m)
18: end if
19: if l = ¬Pm then
20: −∂P ←−∂P∪{m}
21: HB←HB\ {Pm,Om}
22: R← {A(r)\ →֒C(r)⊖m| r ∈ RP[m,n] for an index n}
23: end if
24: end for
25: end procedure
Before describing how Algorithm 4 works, let us recall some concepts about the
provability of a literal. Given a Defeasible Theory, a modal literal ✷l ∈ F is trivially
proved with the corresponding modality by definition. Furthermore, we also stated that a
non-modal literal is proved within the theory if it is a fact.
Based on these facts, the procedure described in Algorithm 4 CHECKFACTS begins
by removing all factual literals from every rule where they appear as an antecedent; it also
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removes all rules whose body contains a complementary literal (line 3). The superiority
relation is then modified in view of this operation (line 4).
From this point on, different operations are performed on account of which kind of
factual literal is considered.
1. If l is a non-modal literal, we truncate the head of all rules at l, where l appears as
an obligation (lines 5–7);
2. if l is a positive modal literal for obligation (lines 8–10) or permission (lines 16–18),
then Algorithm 2 MODIFYOBL (respectively Algorithm 3 MODIFYPERM) is called
to properly modify the theory. Notice that operations in lines 7–8 of Algorithm 2
MODIFYOBL and 6–7 of Algorithm 3 MODIFYPERM are not performed in this case,
since they are equivalent to lines 3–4 of Algorithm 4 CHECKFACTS;
3. if l is a negative modal literal for obligation ¬Om (lines 11–15), then −∂Om holds,
and clause (2) of Definition 7 makes all rules containing m as an obligation in their
heads discarded for all literals after m. Hence, we truncate all these chains at m, and
then remove m (line 14);
4. if l is a negative modal literal for permission ¬Pm (lines 19–23), then −∂Pm holds
in the theory. Thus, we remove m in every chain where m appears as a permission
(line 22).
We conclude this section by presenting and describing Algorithm 5 COMPUTEDEFEASIBLE,
which represents the main core for the computation of the defeasible extension of a
theory.
In lines 1–5, we initialise variables +∂O, +∂P and, for each literal l, a set R[l]in f d con-
taining all the rules for l that are defeated by a rule for the opposite. Algorithm 4
CHECKFACTS is invoked to compute all defeasible conclusions derived from the set of
facts (line 6).
The algorithm consists of a main loop (the repeat cycle in lines 7–35) that performs
a series of transformations to reduce a Defeasible Theory into a simpler equivalent one.
The loop ends when no more modifications on the extension are made, i.e., when both
variables ∂+
✷
and ∂−
✷
are empty at the end of an iteration.
At the beginning of the cycle, we re-initialise the set of conclusions computed at the
iteration of the main loop (lines 8–9).
The for cycle in lines 10–32 checks all the rules for every literal l of the theory. In
lines 11–13 it modifies the theory invoking Algorithm 1 DISCARD for all modal literals
with no supporting chains. Lines 14–31 loop over all rules in the theory for the current
literal l, and checks if an applicable rule exists with l as first element in its head. If the
rule introduces l as an obligation (lines 14–22), then we have to collect all rules for the
opposite, and check if they are all defeated by a rule for l. If this is the case, then we have
proved +∂Ol and Algorithm 2 MODIFYOBL must be invoked.
On the other hand, if l is introduced as a permission (lines 23–31), then we have to
take into account only obligation rules for ∼l, and to check if every rule for ∼l as an
obligation is defeated by at least one rule for the opposite. If so, condition +∂Pl holds,
and Algorithm 3 MODIFYPERM is invoked. Finally, all modifications on the extension,
due to the execution of the cycle, are stored in the global sets of conclusions (lines 33–
34).
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Algorithm 5 ComputeDefeasible
Input: A defeasible theory D.
Output: The extension E(D) of D.
1: for ✷ ∈ {O,P} do
2: +∂✷← /0
3: −∂✷← /0
4: end for
5: R[l]in f d ← /0 for each l ∈ Lit
6: CHECKFACTS
7: repeat
8: ∂+
✷
← /0
9: ∂−
✷
← /0
10: for ✷l ∈ HB,✷ ∈ {O,P} do
11: if R✷[l] = /0 then
12: DISCARD(l,✷)
13: end if
14: if there exists r ∈ RO[l,1] such that A(r) = /0 then
15: R[∼l]in f d ← R[∼l]in f d ∪{s ∈ R[∼l]| r > s}
16: if {s ∈ R[∼l]| s > r}= /0 then
17: DISCARD(∼l,✷)
18: if R[∼l]\R[∼l]in f d = /0 and ¬Ol 6∈ F then
19: MODIFYOBL(l)
20: end if
21: end if
22: end if
23: if there exists r ∈ RP[l,1] such that A(r) = /0 then
24: R[∼l]in f d ← R[∼l]in f d ∪{s ∈ RO[∼l]| r > s}
25: if {s ∈ R[∼l]| s > r}= /0 then
26: DISCARD(∼l,O)
27: if RO[∼l]\R[∼l]in f d = /0 then
28: MODIFYPERM(l)
29: end if
30: end if
31: end if
32: end for
33: +∂✷←+∂✷∪∂+✷
34: −∂✷←−∂✷∪∂−✷
35: until ∂+
✷
= /0 and ∂−
✷
= /0
36: return E(D) = (+∂O,+∂P,−∂O,−∂P)
4.3. Properties of defeasible theory transformations
The properties we are going to show below are related to operations that transform a
theory D into an equivalent simpler theory D′ (where by the term ‘simpler’ we mean a
theory with a minor number of symbols in it).
The transformations operate either by removing some elements from it, or by delet-
ing a rule from the theory. Given the functional nature of the operations, we will refer to
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the rules in the target theory with the same names/labels as the rules in the source theory.
Thus, given a rule r ∈ D, we will refer to the rule corresponding to it in D′ (if it exists)
with the same label, namely r.
For the sake of readability, the proofs of all the theoretical results (Lemmas 19–28)
are not reported in this subsection and the interested reader can find them in Appendix A.
Given a non-modal literal p ∈ F , we can obtain an equivalent theory by removing p in
every rule where it appears in the antecedent. Moreover, if the rule is for an obligation,
Definition 7 clause (2) ensures that the rule will be discarded for every element after
p, and therefore we can truncate the reparation chain at p. Instead, if the rule is for a
permission, we cannot operate on it. In both cases, we only consider rules where the
complement of p does not appear in the antecedent. Finally, the superiority relation can
be simplified by removing all tuples with a rule containing ∼p in the antecedent, or an
obligation rule for an element after p in its consequent.
Lemma 19. Let D = (F,R,>) be a theory such that p ∈ F ∩Lit. Let D′ = (F ′,R′,>′) be
the theory obtained from D where
F ′ = F \ {p}
R′ ={r : A(r)\ {p}⇒O C(r)!p| r ∈ R, A(r)∩ p˜ = /0} ∪
{r : A(r)\ {p}⇒P C(r)| r ∈ R, A(r)∩ p˜ = /0}
>′=> \{(r,s),(s,r)| r,s ∈ R,A(r)∩ p˜ 6= /0}.
Then D≡ D′.
Starting from the modified theory given by the transformations of the previous lemma,
we now consider a theory with only modal literals in the set of facts. If a literal p is
provable as an obligation, then we can simplify the theory by removing Op in every an-
tecedent of the rules in R, and erase the rules where at least one element of O˜p appears
in the antecedent. Since by hypothesis F ∩Lit = /0, if p is present in the reparation chain
of an obligation rule, we simplify the theory by removing p from the consequent. If ∼p
is in the consequent, we can also truncate the reparation chain of the rule since, by Defi-
nition 7 clause (2), the rule will be discarded for each element after ∼p (Proposition 15
Part 1 states that −∂O∼p holds as well). Moreover, Proposition 15 Part 2 ensures that
−∂P∼p holds. Thus, Definition 6 clause (3) allows us to remove∼p in the consequent of
permission rules for ∼p. Finally, the superiority relation can be simplified by removing
all tuples with a rule containing at least one element of O˜p in the antecedent.
Lemma 20. Let D = (F,R,>) be a theory such that F ∩Lit = /0 and D ⊢ +∂O p. Let
D′ = (F,R′,>′) be the theory obtained from D where
R′ ={r : A(r)\ {Op}⇒O C(r)!∼p⊖∼p| r ∈ R, A(r)∩ O˜p = /0} ∪
{r : A(r)\ {Op}⇒O C(r)⊖ p| r ∈ R, A(r)∩ O˜p = /0} ∪
{r : A(r)\ {Op}⇒P C(r)⊖∼p| r ∈ R, A(r)∩ O˜p = /0}
>′ => \{(r,s),(s,r)| r,s ∈ R,A(r)∩ O˜p 6= /0}.
Then D≡ D′.
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As the previous lemma, we consider a theory with only modal literals in the set of facts.
Since the theory proves −∂O p, also ¬Op holds. Thus, we obtain an equivalent simpler
theory by erasing all rules with Op as one of the antecedents, and by removing ¬Op
in each rule where it appears in the antecedent. Again, by Definition 7 clause (2), for
every obligation rule we can truncate each reparation chain with p in the consequent
and eliminate it from such a chain. Finally, the superiority relation can be simplified by
removing all the pairs with a rule containing Op in the antecedent.
Lemma 21. Let D = (F,R,>) be a theory such that F ∩Lit = /0 and D ⊢ −∂O p. Let
D′ = (F,R′,>′) be theory obtained from D where
R′ ={r : A(r)\ {¬Op}⇒✷ C(r)| r ∈ R, A(r)∩{Op}= /0} ∪
{r : A(r)⇒O C(r)!p⊖ p| r ∈ R, A(r)∩{Op}= /0}
>′=> \{(r,s),(s,r)| r,s ∈ R,A(r)∩{Op} 6= /0}.
Then D≡ D′.
We can defeasibly prove a literal p as a permission. A simpler equivalent theory is one
where we remove Pp in each set of antecedents and where we erase all the rules con-
taining at least one element of the complement of P˜p in the antecedent. Proposition 15
Part 3 states that −∂O∼p holds. Thus, by Definition 7 clause (2), if ∼p appears in the
reparation chain of an obligation rule, we can remove it after having truncate the chain
at ∼p. Instead, if we consider permission rules with p in the consequent, by Definition 7
clause (3), we can truncate the corresponding reparation chain at p. Finally, the superi-
ority relation can be simplified by removing all the pairs with a rule with an element of
P˜p in the antecedent.
Lemma 22. Let D = (F,R,>) be a theory such that F ∩Lit = /0 and D ⊢ +∂P p. Let
D′ = (F,R′,>′) be theory obtained from D where
R′ ={r : A(r)\ {Pp}⇒O C(r)!∼p⊖∼p| r ∈ R, A(r)∩ P˜p = /0} ∪
{r : A(r)\ {Pp}⇒P C(r)!p| r ∈ R, A(r)∩ P˜p = /0}
>′=> \{(r,s),(s,r)| r,s ∈ R,A(r)∩ P˜p 6= /0}.
Then D≡ D′.
The theory proves −∂P p, allowing ¬Pp to hold. Thus, we obtain an equivalent theory
if we erase all the rules with Pp in the set of the antecedents and if we remove ¬Pp
where it appears in the tail of a rule. Moreover, if the rule is for a permission, we remove
p from the reparation chain. Finally, we change the superiority relation by erasing the
tuples with a rule with Pp in the antecedent.
Lemma 23. Let D = (F,R,>) be a theory such that F ∩Lit = /0 and D ⊢ −∂P p. Let
D′ = (F,R′,>′) be theory obtained from D where
R′ ={r : A(r)\ {¬Pp}⇒✷ C(r)| r ∈ R, A(r)∩{Pp}= /0} ∪
{r : A(r)⇒P C(r)⊖ p| r ∈ R, A(r)∩{Pp}= /0}
>′=> \{(r,s),(s,r)| r,s ∈ R,A(r)∩{Pp} 6= /0}.
Then D≡ D′.
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The following two lemmas represent conditions under which a literal can be proved as
an obligation or as a permission. The transformations dictated by the previous lemmas
empty the antecedent of every applicable rule.
Definition 24. Given a theory D = (F,R,>), and a set of rules S, the subset of S of
inferiorly defeated rules for a literal p, S[p]in f d is thus defined: r ∈ S[p]in f d iff
1. ∃s ∈ R[∼p] such that A(r) = /0 and s > r, and
2. if r ∈ RP[p], then s ∈ RO[∼p].
Lemma 25. Let D = (F,R,>) be a theory such that F ∩ModLit = /0, ∃r ∈ RO[p,1],
A(r) = /0, and R[∼p]⊆ Rin f d . Then D ⊢+∂O p.
Lemma 26. Let D = (F,R,>) be a theory such that F ∩ModLit = /0, ∃r ∈ RP[p,1],
A(r) = /0, and RO[∼p]⊆ Rin f d . Then D ⊢+∂P p.
The next two lemmas concern conditions to determine when it is possible to assert that a
literal is negatively provable.
Lemma 27. Let D = (F,R,>) be a theory such that F ∩ModLit = /0 and R✷[p] = /0, for
✷ ∈ {O,P}. Then D ⊢ −∂✷p.
Lemma 28. Let D = (F,R,>) be a theory such that F ∩ModLit = /0, and ∃r ∈ R[p,1]
such that A(r) = /0 and rsup = /0. Then
1. if r ∈ RO, then D ⊢ −∂✷∼p, ✷ ∈ {O,P};
2. if r ∈ RP∪Rde f , then D ⊢ −∂O∼p.
5. Computational results
In this section we present the computational properties of the algorithms previously de-
scribed. Since, as stated above, the first three algorithms are sub-routines of the two main
ones, we will present the correctness and completeness results of these algorithms inside
theorems for Algorithms 4 CHECKFACTS and 5 COMPUTEDEFEASIBLE.
In order to properly exhibit results on the complexity of the algorithms, we need the
following definition.
Definition 29. Given a Defeasible Theory D, the size S of D is the number of literal
occurrences plus the number of the rules in D.
We also report some key ideas and intuitions behind our implementation.
1. Each operation on global sets±∂✷ and ∂±✷ requires a constant time, as we manipulate
finite sets of literals;
2. For each literal ✷l ∈ HB, we implement a hash table with pointers to rules where
the literal occurs; thus, retrieving the set of rules containing a given literal requires
constant time.
3. The superiority relation can also be implemented by means of hash tables; once
again, the information required to modify a given tuple can be accessed in constant
time.
Theorem 30. Given a modal Defeasible Theory D with size S, Algorithm 4 CHECKFACTS
terminates and its computational complexity is O(S).
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Proof. Termination of Algorithm 4 CHECKFACTS is given by definition of modal De-
feasible Theory, since the internal sub-routines (i.e., Algorithm 2 MODIFYOBL and 3
MODIFYPERM), as well as the algorithm itself, manipulate finite sets of rules and facts.
For a correct analysis of the complexity of Algorithm 4 CHECKFACTS, it is of the
utmost importance to correctly comprehend Definition 29. Here we underline that the
size S of a theory represents the total number of occurrences of each literal in every rule
of such a theory. Let us examine a theory with Y literals and whose size is Z. If we
consider a cycle whose purpose is to call, for each literal, a procedure that selectively
deletes it from all the rules of the theory (no matter to what end), a rough computational
complexity would be O(Z2). In fact, the complexity of the procedure by itself is bound
to the number of rules in the theory, which is in O(Z), and this procedure is iterated
Y ∈ O(Z) times.
However, a more fined-grained analysis shows that the complexity of this loop is
lower. The mistake of the previous analysis is that it considers the complexity of the pro-
cedure separately from the complexity of the external loop, whilst they are strictly de-
pendent. Indeed, the overall number of operations made by the sum of all loop iterations
cannot outrun the number of occurrences of the literals, O(Z), because the operations
in the inner procedure directly decrease, iteration after iteration, the number of the re-
maining repetitions of the outmost loop, and the other way around. Therefore, the overall
complexity is not bound to O(Z) ·O(Z) = O(Z2), but to O(Z)+O(Z) = O(Z).
We can contextualise the above reasoning to Algorithm 4 CHECKFACTS. The main
cycle in lines 2–26 is iterated over the set of facts, whose cardinality is in O(S); the op-
erations in lines 10 and 19 (invoking Algorithms 2 MODIFYOBL and 3 MODIFYPERM)
represent an additive factor O(S) in the overall complexity of the algorithm. Finally, all
operations on the set of rules and the superiority relation performed by conditions in lines
5, 12, and 21 require constant time, given the implementation of data structures proposed
above. Therefore, we can state that the complexity of the algorithm is O(S).
Theorem 31. Given a Defeasible Theory D with size S, Algorithm 5
COMPUTEDEFEASIBLE terminates and its computational complexity is O(S).
Proof. When referring to the termination of Algorithm 5 COMPUTEDEFEASIBLE, the
most important part we have to analyse is the repeat cycle in lines 7–35. Once an instance
of the cycle has been performed, we must be in one of the following (mutually exclusive)
situations:
1. no modification of the extension has occurred. In this case, line 29 ensures the ter-
mination of the algorithm;
2. the theory is modified with respect to a literal in the Modal Herbrand Base HB.
Notice that the algorithm takes care of removing the literal from HB once it has
performed the suitable operations. As the set is finite, the process described above
eventually empties HB, and at the next iteration of the cycle we have no means
to modify the extension of the theory. In this case as well, the algorithm ends its
execution.
The analysis of the complexity of Algorithm 5 COMPUTEDEFEASIBLE straightly fol-
lows from the reasoning proposed to demonstrate the computational complexity of Algo-
rithm 4 CHECKFACTS. Thus, the repeat cycle in lines 7–35 is in O(S), while procedure
invocations in lines 12, 17, 19, 26 and 28 represent an additive factor as before. Since the
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operations in lines 15 and 24, and the checks in lines 14, 16, 18, 23, 25 and 27 also weight
a constant time, the computational complexity of Algorithm 5 COMPUTEDEFEASIBLE
is bound to O(S).
Theorem 32. Algorithm 5 COMPUTEDEFEASIBLE is sound and complete.
Proof. As already argued at the beginning of the section, the aim of Algorithm 5
COMPUTEDEFEASIBLE is to compute the defeasible extension of a given theory D
through successive transformations on the set of facts and rules, and on the superiority
relation. These transformations act in ways which obtain at each step a new simpler the-
ory while retaining the same extension. Again, we remark that the word ‘simpler’ is used
to denote a theory with less elements in it. Since we have already proved the termination
of the algorithm, it eventually comes to a fix-point theory where no more operations can
be made.
In order to demonstrate the soundness of Algorithm 5, we show in the list below
that all the operations performed by the algorithm are those described in Lemmas 19–28,
where we have already proved the soundness of the operation involved.
• Algorithm 1 DISCARD:
– Lines 2–4: Lemma 21 and 23.
• Algorithm 2 MODIFYOBL:
– Lines 2–4, 10–13: Lemma 20;
– Lines 6–9: Proposition 14 and Lemma 20.
• Algorithm 3 MODIFYPERM:
– Lines 2–3, 9–11: Lemma 22;
– Lines 5–8: Proposition 13 and Lemma 22.
• Algorithm 4 CHECKFACTS:
– Lines 3–4: Lemmas 19–23;
– Lines 5–8: Lemma 19;
– Lines 9–11: Algorithm 2;
– Lines 12–17: Lemma 21;
– Lines 18–20: Algorithm 3;
– Lines 21–25: Lemma 23.
• Algorithm 5 COMPUTEDEFEASIBLE:
– Lines 11–13: Lemma 27;
– Lines 17 and 26: Lemma 28;
– Lines 18–20: Lemmas 25 and 20;
– Lines 27–29: Lemma 26 and 22.
These results state that if in the initial theory a literal is either defeasibly proved or not,
so it will be in the final theory; thus proving the soundness of the algorithm.
Moreover, since all lemmas show the equivalence of the two theories, and since
the equivalence relation is a bijection, this also gives the completeness of Algorithm 5
COMPUTEDEFEASIBLE.
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6. Discussion: The Three Types of Permission
Resuming the discussion of Section 2, we will delve into the technical aspects of the
three mentioned concepts of permissions within our framework.
The idea of weak or negative permission is easily represented in the system as fol-
lows:
Definition 33 (Weak Permission). Let D be a Defeasible Theory. A literal l is weakly
permitted in D iff D ⊢ −∂O∼l.
One remark is in order here: Definition 33 is useful to check whether a literal l is
weakly permitted within the theory, but it cannot be directly used to explicitly derive Pl
for triggering any rule where this modal literal occurs in the antecedent. In fact, when
Pl appears in the antecedent of a rule, then the only way to activate such a rule is to
explicitly derive Pl.
However, weak permissions are decisive in the applicability of a rule for conditions
(1.2) of Definitions 5 and 6; when ¬Ol occurs in the antecedent of the rule, then the
theory must prove−∂Ol. This is equivalent to say that ∼l is weakly permitted in D.
This reading assumes that the distinction between weak and strong permission goes
beyond the idea, defended by [2], that there is only one prescriptive type of permission.
If the reader finds our proposal limiting, we can trivially revise the rule applicability
conditions at point (1.3) (and adjust the algorithms accordingly) by establishing that,
when Pl occurs in the antecedent of any rule r, r is applicable if one of the following
conditions holds: (i) +∂Pl, or (ii)−∂O∼l (observe that +∂Pl implies−∂O∼l, but not vice
versa).
A straightforward result (from Proposition 15 Part 1) regarding weak permissions
follows:
Proposition 34. Let D be any O-consistent Defeasible Theory. For any literal l, if
D ⊢+∂Ol, then l is weakly permitted.
As expected, weak permission enjoys the deontic principle “Ought implies Can”,
i.e., the principle that in deontic logic is Ol → Pl.
We now consider the two ways to obtain strong permissions in Defeasible Logic: using
either explicit permissive norms or defeaters.
The first case is naturally captured in the logical framework proposed in Sections
3 and 4. In the simplest case, a literal like Pl is derived in a theory D when there is a
successful reasoning chain in which the last rule has the form a1, . . . ,an ⇒P l.
More complex cases are due to the fact that l may occur in an ⊘-expression. In this
case l is obtained as strongly permitted if, for each literal c preceding l in the sequence,
one of the following conditions hold:
• if c leads to derive Oc (i.e., c occurs in an ⊗-subsequence of the main sequence
where l occurs), then this obligation must be obtained and violated;
• if c leads to derive Pc (i.e., c occurs in an⊙-subsequence of the main sequence where
l occurs), then this permission is successfully attacked by an opposite obligation.
The introduction of sequences of permissions and obligations enriches the language in
a significant way, since it allows us to express a preference among obligations and per-
missions when they are logically compatible. In the case of sequences of positive per-
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missions, an ⊙-sequence states that a permissive exception of an obligation is preferred
with respect to another possible exception of the same obligation. However, this exten-
sion does not conceptually change the fundamental intuition that is also behind the basic
case where permissive norms have the form a1, . . . ,an ⇒P l: the antecedent of positive
permissive rules with head l provides sufficient defeasible reasons to derive Pl.
The second method considered in Section 2 to capture the notion of strong permis-
sions acting as exceptions to obligations looks at permissions as undercutters in argu-
mentation theory (this idea was discussed in [10]): a permissive norm with head l op-
erates in such a way that, if applicable, it is not a sufficient reason for deriving neither
l, nor ∼l, but it is a sufficient reason for blocking the derivation of ∼l as obligatory.
In Defeasible Logic, this idea is naturally implemented by using defeaters. For the sake
of simplicity, we have not considered this concept of strong permission in Sections 3
and 4. However, to cover this case it is sufficient to adopt one the following definitions
(compare the definition of RP[q,n] in Section 3):
Definition 35. The set RP[q,n] is X ∪Y where
• X is the set of rules where q appears at index n, and the operator⊙ precedes q;
• Y is the set of defeaters with head q.7
Definition 36. The set RP[q,n] is the set of defeaters with head q.8
Definition 35 adds the defeaters to the set of rules that can be used to derive tagged
literals like +∂Pl, obtaining modal literals like Pl. Definition 36 restricts derivations of
strong permissions only to reasoning chains where the last rule is a defeater. In both
cases, except these new definitions, we do not need to change anything else in the logic
(hence, in the proof conditions for ±∂P) or the algorithms.
What is the difference between strong permissions obtained via rules for permission
and the ones obtained via defeaters? Although rules for P and defeaters are not in general
equivalent, as we have informally suggested in Section 2, they behave quite similarly
when they are used to derive permissions, as well as to attack obligation rules supporting
the opposite conclusion. In other words, defeaters do not clash with any permissive rules.
Consequently, if this reading of defeaters is simply embedded within the proof conditions
for ±∂P and for ±∂O by adopting either Definition 35, or Definition 36, then rules for P
and defeaters play a very similar role in the proof theory. In fact, if we consider condition
(2.3.3) in the proof condition for ±∂O, then two rules like r1 : a1, . . . ,an ⇒P l and r2 :
a1, . . . ,an❀ l both attack any rule s for obligation supporting∼l, and s can counterattack
r1 and r2 as well.
We remark that the significant difference between the rules for P and defeaters is
that defeaters do not allow for having sequences of permissions in their head.
Finally, notice that neither type of strong permission considered enjoys the principle
“Ought implies Can”. This result comes directly from Proposition 15 and is based on the
idea that the only manner to derive strong permissions is by means of reasoning chains
where the last rule occurring in them is either a rule for P or a defeater (i.e., explicit
permissive norms).
7In this case, n is always 1.
8Since n is always 1, n can be omitted and we can simply write RP[q].
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7. Summary and Related Work
In this paper we proposed an extension of Defeasible Logic to represent three concepts of
defeasible permission. In particular, we examined different types of explicit permissive
norms that work as exceptions to opposite obligations. We also discussed how strong per-
missions can be represented with or without introducing a new consequence relation for
inferring conclusions from explicit permissive norms. Finally, we combined a preference
operator applicable to contrary-to-duty obligations with a new one representing ordered
sequences of strong permissions which derogate from prohibitions. Special attention was
devoted to the computational aspects of the logic.
Although logicians have mostly overlooked the concept of permission over time,
the history of deontic logic offers some well-known key ideas to interpret it. Indeed, the
original intuition (proposed by [34], among others) that permissions are the modal dual of
obligations, though technically simple and attractive, proved to be partial and simplistic
(for a discussion, see [35,2,1]). Hence, subsequent contributions have helped to expand
the picture in several directions. The distinction between weak (or negative) and strong
(or positive) permission [35] plays an important role in this regard. Though, Alchourro´n
and Bulygin [3,2] argued that there is only one prescriptive sense of permission, while
the distinction between weak and strong permission makes sense only at a descriptive
level, depending on how any permission is obtained within a system of norms. Legal
theorists such as Alf Ross and Norberto Bobbio [28,8] claimed that legal permissions
are in fact exceptions to obligations imposing the opposite, even though this did not lead
them (Ross, in particular) to clearly link the concept of exception with the one of strong
permission. Other theorists even denied the usefulness of seeing strong permissions as
exceptions [27,29], since the former ones introduce nothing but strong indifference in
normative systems. This thesis was instead rejected by [3].
The purpose of this paper was not to provide a comprehensive logical theory of
permission, nor to take an exhaustive critical position in the debate that we have very
briskly recalled. Our goal was twofold:
• to capture some aspects of permissions within a broader view of defeasible normative
reasoning;
• to study the defeasibility of permissions in a computationally efficient logical frame-
work.
At a more theoretical level, our work shares with [25,9,33] some conceptual assumptions.
Slightly rephrasing [33]’s analysis, the following guidelines inspired our treatment of the
concept of permission:
1. “no logic of norms without attention to the system of which they form part” [26]:
our investigation of the concept of permission looks at how permissive norms and
other types of norms interact within systems;
2. the distinction between positive and negative permission is meaningful;
3. one fundamental role of positive permissions is that of stating exceptions to obliga-
tions; accordingly, positive permissions are supposed to override, or at least block,
some deontic conclusions coming from other norms;
4. the logical space of weak permission is the one left unregulated by mandatory norms.
However, [25,9,33] are all based on a different logical formalism, Input/Output Logic
(IOL) [24], thus it is difficult to compare in detail those contributions with the present
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one. Normative reasoning is viewed in IOL as a rule-based process of manipulation of
inputs (factual premises) into outputs (normative conclusions). The analysis of norma-
tive systems consists in representing conditional norms simply as ordered pairs (a,b)
where a represents the antecedent of the rule, and b its consequent: “if a then b” where
a has factual content and b normative content, viz. an obligation or a permission. Typi-
cally, both a and b are taken to be formulas from propositional logic. Each set of such
ordered pairs can be seen as an inferential mechanism which, given an input, determines
an output based on those connections. Formally, given a set of positive mandatory norms
(obligations) G and a set of permissive norms (positive permissions) P, a closure oper-
ation C, and a set of facts A, the output of G∪P given C and a set of input formulas
is outC(G∪P,A) = {b | (a,b) ∈C(G∪P) and s ∈ A}. This approach allows for defining
different concepts of permission [25,9]9:
Negative permission: (a,x) is a negative permission w.r.t. G iff (a,¬x) 6∈ outC(G); if
x is not prohibited by the system given a, then is negatively permitted under those
factual conditions a.
Static permission: (a,x) is a static permission w.r.t. (G,P) iff (a,x) ∈ outC(G ∪
{(c,d)}) for some (c,d) ∈ P; (a,x) is statically permitted iff it follows from adding
a positive permissive norm to G;
Dynamic permission: (a,x) is a dynamic permission w.r.t. (G,P) iff (c,¬d) ∈
outC(G,∪{a,¬x}) for some (c,d) ∈ P; (a,x) is permitted when, given the obliga-
tions in G, we cannot prohibit x under the condition a without prohibiting d under
condition c which is however explicitly permitted by the system.
Another concept of permission was proposed in [33] to specifically capture the idea of
exception10:
Exemption: (a,x) is an exemption w.r.t. (G,P) iff (a,¬x) ∈ outC(G)\outC(G)− (c,¬d)
for some (c,d) ∈ P; (a,x) is an exception if the code contains the prohibition of x
under condition a which, unless it is removed, it clashes with an explicit permission
in P.
Since IOL and Defeasible Logic are different logical systems, which were designed
for very different purposes, it is difficult to compare them also in regard to the problem
of permission. Despite any possible connection between the two logics, which is still
an open research problem (Defeasible Logic in fact characterises a consequence relation
falling within cumulative reasoning [7]), an immediate comparison shows significant
differences. In particular, formulas in IOL are based on propositional logic while rules
in Defeasible Logic are built using atomic literals, modal literals, and their negations.
A second difference is that the inference machinery of IOL leads to derive pairs, while
the inference output in Defeasible Logic refers to theories and consists of sets of tagged
literals.
However, there are some general similarities in both approaches.
• First, Defeasible Logic, like IOL, models explicit and implicit permissions by dis-
tinguishing in an analogous manner a consequence relation for obligation and one
for permission.
• Second, the definition of negative or weak permission in both formalisms is the same.
9[33] offers a different technical treatment, which is however in line with most intuitions discussed in [25,9].
10[33] proposed two definitions. Here, we report on the simpler one.
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• Third, although we have not discussed in our approach the notion of static permis-
sion, it seems relatively simple to capture it in Defeasible Logic: indeed, we may
derive that some p is permitted by making an essential use in the derivation of a rule
for explicit permission. The only feature that makes the difference with respect to
Defeasible Logic is that in IOL static permission admits the principle “Ought implies
Can”, which does not hold for strong permission in our approach.
Similarly, since both approaches distinguish between permissions rebutting obliga-
tions and permissions providing exceptions, we do not see any difficulty in capturing in
Defeasible Logic the intuition behind the concept of exemption, even though exceptions
are more naturally captured in Defeasible Logic by using the superiority relation between
rules. The concept of dynamic permission can be instead expressed in Defeasible Logic,
but in a different way, due to the sceptical character of Defeasible Logic: if we add a pro-
hibition for some p, which is incompatible with any rule for explicit permission (or even
a defeater), then we cannot derive such a prohibition (unless it is stated to be stronger
than any other rule), and so p is dynamically permitted.
A novelty of our paper is the introduction of the new operator ⊙ to express prefer-
ences between explicit permissions. A somehow similar idea has been suggested (though
with different purposes) by [9], where a preference relation among pairs (for obligations
and permissions) was introduced. Technically, it is not clear if that approach can be re-
framed in our setting. In fact, adopting that option in Defeasible Logic would not work,
as the superiority relation in Defeasible Logic plays a role in the proof theory only in
case of rule conflicts. A clear advantage of the current proposal is that it adopts a rich
formal language where
• modal operators can occur in the applicability conditions of rules (the inputs in IOL
are always factual);
• we have two ordering types between permissions: the one expressed by ⊙ and the
one induced by the superiority relation which applies to defeaters.
To the best of our knowledge, there is no logical system having linear complexity
with analogous normative reasoning capabilities.
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A. Appendix
We now prove the properties related to operations that transform a theory D into an
equivalent simpler theory D′ (we recall that the term “simpler” means a theory with a
minor number of symbols in it). The transformations operate on rules either by removing
some elements from some rules, or by deleting rules from a theory. Given the functional
nature of the operations involved, we will refer to the rules in the target theory with the
same names/labels as the rules in the source theory. Thus, given a rule r ∈ D, we will
refer to the rule corresponding to it in D′, if it exists, with the same label, namely r.
Lemma 19. Let D = (F,R,>) be a theory such that p ∈ F ∩Lit. Let D′ = (F ′,R′,>′) be
the theory obtained from D, where
F ′ =F \ {p}
R′ ={r : A(r)\ {p}⇒O C(r)!p|r ∈ R,A(r)∩ p˜ = /0}∪
{r : A(r)\ {p}⇒P C(r)|r ∈ R,A(r)∩ p˜ = /0}
>′=> \{(r,s),(s,r)|r,s ∈ R,A(r)∩ p˜ 6= /0}.
Then D≡ D′.
Proof. The proof is by induction on the length of a derivation P.
For the inductive base, we consider all the modal derivations for a generic literal q
in the theory.
P(1) =+∂Oq. This is possible in two cases: (1) Oq∈ F , or (2) O∼q 6∈ F , ¬Oq 6∈ F and
P∼q 6∈ F , and ∃r ∈ RO[q, i] that is applicable for q at i at P(1) and every rule for ∼q is
either (a) discarded for ∼q at P(1), or (b) defeated by a stronger rule for q applicable at
P(1).
For (1), by construction of D′, Oq ∈ F iff Oq ∈ F ′, thus +∂Oq is provable both in D
and in D′.
For (2), again by construction of D′, the modal literals in the clause do not appear in
F iff they do not appear in F ′. Furthermore, an obligation rule r ∈ RO[q, i] is applicable
for q at P(1) iff i = 1, A(r) ⊆ F , and ∼p 6∈ A(r) since p ∈ F . Therefore A(r) ⊆ F if
A(r)\ {p} ⊆ F ′. This means that if a rule is applicable at P(1) in D then it is applicable
at P(1) in D′. In the other direction, suppose that r is applicable in D′, thus in particular
A(r) ⊆ F ′. In both cases where r has p in its antecedent or it is not in D, we obtain
A(r)⊆ F , therefore r is applicable in D.
Let us now consider a rule attacking r, namely a rule s ∈ R[∼q, j]. For such a rule,
we have to analyse cases (a) and (b) above.
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(a) A rule s is discarded for ∼q at j at P(1) in D iff: (i) ∃ai ∈ A(s)∩Lit and ai /∈ F ,
or (ii) ∃ck ∈ C(s), k < j such that ck ∈ F , and s ∈ RO[ck,k] by condition (2) of a rule
being discarded for +∂O.
For (i), we are sure that ai 6= p since p ∈ F by hypothesis. If ai = ∼p, then s is
discarded in D and, by construction, the rule is not in D′. Hence R′[∼q] ⊆ R[∼q]. If
ai 6= ∼p, then by construction ai /∈ F iff ai /∈ F ′. For (ii), if ck = p, then the rule is
discarded in D, the consequent of s is truncated at k in D′, and ∼q does not occur in the
consequent of s in D′, i.e., s /∈ R′[∼q]. If ck 6= p, then the rule is also discarded in D′ since
the only difference between F and F ′ is that p is in F but not in F ′. To summarise, if a
rule is discarded for ∼q at j at P(1) in D, then the rule is either not in D′, or discarded in
D′.
For the other direction, in R′ there are no rules containing either p, or ∼p. Hence, if
we have ai ∈ A(s) and ai /∈ F ′, then ai /∈ F . Similarly for ck, if ck ∈ F ′, then ck ∈ F . The
difference between D and D′ is that in R we have rules with ∼p in the antecedent and
rules with p preceding q in the consequent, and these rules are not in R′. Since p ∈ F , all
rules in R for which there is no corresponding rule in R′ are discarded in D.
(b) The superiority relation is modified in a way that we only remove instances
where one of the rules is discarded in D. But only rules that are not discarded are active
in the clauses of the proof conditions where the superiority relation is involved.
From the discussion above, if a rule is applicable for q at 1 at P(1) in D, then the
rule is also applicable in D′. If a rule is discarded for ∼q at index 1 at P(1) in D, then the
rule is not in D′, or it is discarded in D′. If a rule s for ∼q is applicable in D, then there
is an applicable rule t for q stronger than s. The rules s and t are applicable, so they are
in D′ and t >′ s. Thus, D′ ⊢+∂Oq.
Similarly to the other direction, if a rule is applicable in D′ then it is applicable in D,
and if it is discarded in D′ then it is discarded in D. The additional rules in D have either
∼p in the antecedent, or p in the consequent, thus these rules are discarded in D, and for
them clause (2.3.1) of +∂O applies. Therefore if we have a derivation of length one of
+∂Oq in D′, then we have D ⊢+∂Oq.
P(1) = +∂Pq. The proof is essentially identical to the inductive base for +∂Oq, with
some slight syntactical modifications dictated by the different proof conditions for +∂P:
(1) Pq∈ F , or (2) O∼q 6∈ F and¬Pq 6∈F , and ∃r ∈RP[q,1] that is applicable for q at P(1)
and every obligation rule for∼q is either (a) discarded for∼q at P(1), or (b) defeated by
a stronger rule for q applicable at P(1).
P(1)=−∂Oq. Clearly clauses (1) and (2.1) of−∂O hold for D iff they hold for D′, given
that F and F ′ have the same modal literals. For clause (2.2), consider a rule r ∈ RO[q,1].
If r is discarded for D then, as we argued above, it is not in R′, or it is discarded in D′.
Also, all rules discarded in D′ are discarded in D, and all rules in R for which there is no
corresponding rule in R′ are discarded in D as well. As regards clauses (2.3.1)–(2.3.3),
we point out that condition t 6> s between two applicable rules t and s is clearly unaffected
passing from D to D′, and the other way around.
P(1) =−∂Pq. This case is a mere variant of the previous one for the negative provabil-
ity of obligations.
For the inductive step, the property of equivalence between D and D′ is assumed up to
the n-th step of a generic proof for a given literal l.
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P(n+ 1) = +∂Oq. Clauses (1) and (2.1) of +∂O follow the same conditions treated in
the inductive base for +∂Oq. As regards clause (2.2), if an applicable rule r ∈ RO[q, i]
for q in D exists, then clauses (1.1)–(1.5) and (2) of Definition 5 are all satisfied. By
inductive hypothesis, we conclude that clauses (1.1)–(1.4) are satisfied by r in D′ as well,
and clause (1.5) is satisfied in D′ by the inductive base. For condition (2), the provability
of ck as an obligation in D′ is given by inductive hypothesis; furthermore, ck 6∈ F or
∼ck ∈ F iff ck 6∈ F ′ or∼ck ∈ F ′ either when ck =∼p or ck 6=∼p since F and F ′ coincide
in both cases (notice that ck 6= p by hypothesis).
The direction from rule applicability in D′ to rule applicability in D is straightfor-
ward. Therefore, a rule r ∈ RO[q, i] is applicable for q in D iff it is applicable for q in
D′. Conditions (2.3.1)–(2.3.3) are treated like cases (a) and (b) for the corresponding
inductive base.
P(n+ 1) = +∂Pq. Again, the inductive base justifies clauses (1), (2.1), (2.3.1), and
(2.3.2) of +∂Pq. Clause (2.2) is satisfied by the same reasoning used in the inductive
step of +∂Oq and by Definition 6, whose additional clause (3) is trivially satisfied by
inductive hypothesis.
P(n+ 1) = −∂Oq. Besides conditions (1), (2.1), (2.3.1), and (2.3.2) – treated as usual
– it remains to prove that a rule for q as a permission at P(n+ 1) is discarded in D iff
it is discarded at P(n+ 1) in D′. To this end, we follow the same analysis carried out
in P(n+ 1) = +∂Oq for rule applicability, using the inductive base and hypothesis, and
Definition 7.
P(n + 1) = −∂Pq. This case is a mere variant of the previous one for the negative
provability as an obligation.
Lemma 20. Let D = (F,R,>) be a theory such that F ∩Lit = /0 and D ⊢ +∂O p. Let
D′ = (F,R′,>′) be the theory obtained from D where
R′ = {r : A(r)\ {Op}⇒O C(r)!∼p⊖∼p,
A(r)\ {Op}⇒O C(r)⊖ p|r ∈ R,A(r)∩ O˜p = /0} ∪
{r : A(r)\ {Op}⇒P C(r)⊖∼p|r ∈ R,A(r)∩ O˜p = /0}
>′ => \{(r,s),(s,r)|r,s ∈ R,A(r)∩ O˜p 6= /0}.
Then D≡ D′.
Proof. The proof is by induction on the length of a derivation P.
For the inductive base, we consider all possible derivations of length one for a
generic literal q in the theory, where Op ∈ F .
P(1) = +∂Oq. From D to D′, the structure of the proof follows the inductive base for
+∂Oq of Lemma 19, where the cases depending on F are trivially satisfied since F = F ′,
and the other steps are obtained by substituting p with Op and ∼p with O˜p.
From D′ to D, there must exist an applicable rule r proving +∂Oq at P(1) in D′. Then
A(r) ⊆ F . By construction of D′, the antecedent of r in D is either the same, or A(r)∪
{Op}, while the consequent has either q as the first element, or only p precedes q. Since
Op ∈ F and p 6∈ F , all the combinations of antecedent and consequent denote applicable
rules in D.
34
As already argued, also in this case if a rule s is discarded at P(1) in D, then it
is not in D′, or it is discarded in D′. In particular, all rules in R for which there is no
corresponding rule in R′ have either (i) ¬Op, O∼p or P∼p in the antecedent, or (ii) ∼p
in the consequent. Since +∂O p holds, clause (1.2) of Definition 7 and Proposition 15
Parts 1 and 2 make the rules of the form (i) discarded in D. Rules of type (ii) are also
discarded in D since Op ∈ F .
P(n+ 1) = +∂Oq. The proof is essentially identical to situation P(n+ 1) = +∂Oq of
Lemma 19. Notice that for rule applicability, clauses l ∈ F (condition (1.5)), and ck 6∈ F
or ∼ck ∈ F (condition (2)) are both true in D and D′, since the set of facts is the same
and it does not contain non-modal literals.
P(1) = +∂Pq, P(n+ 1) = +∂Pq. For the inductive base, notice that by construction of
D′, the antecedent of a rule r for permission in D is either the same, or A(r)∪ {Op},
while the consequent has either q as the first element, or only ∼p precedes q. However,
applicability and refutability of this rule follow the analysis carried out for +∂O. We treat
the inductive step as usual, using the inductive hypothesis and the fact that F = F ′.
The hypothesis F = F ′ and the structure of D′ can be easily used to prove the inductive
base and the inductive step for proof tags −∂O and −∂P.
Both the inductive base and the inductive step for ±∂X q with X = {O,P} in the case
where Op 6∈ F are straightforward. Indeed, even when Op ∈ A(r) in D, the hypothesis
+∂O p allows an applicable rule in D′ to be also applicable in D. The same hypothesis
allows us to conclude that a discarded rule in D is also discarded in D′, and the other way
around.
Lemma 21. Let D = (F,R,>) be a theory such that F ∩Lit = /0 and D ⊢ −∂O p. Let
D′ = (F,R′,>′) be theory obtained from D where
R′ = {r : A(r)\ {¬Op}⇒O C(r)!p⊖ p|r ∈ R,A(r)∩{Op}= /0}
>′ => \{(r,s),(s,r)|r,s ∈ R,A(r)∩{Op} 6= /0}.
Then D≡ D′.
Proof. Since D ⊢+∂Ol implies D ⊢ −∂O∼l by Proposition 15 Part 1, the modifications
on R′ and >′ represent a particular case of Lemma 20, where l = ∼p. The only differ-
ence is that we eliminate from D rules with Op in the antecedent, and we modify the
antecedent of the others eliminating ¬Op (we recall that condition −∂O p makes ¬Op
defeasibly proved in our framework). In the case that RO[p] = /0, no modifications on the
consequent of rules are made since literal p does not appear in any chain by hypothe-
sis.
Lemma 22. Let D = (F,R,>) be a theory such that F ∩Lit = /0 and D ⊢ +∂P p. Let
D′ = (F,R′,>′) be theory obtained from D where
R′ ={r : A(r)\ {Pp}⇒O C(r)!∼p⊖∼p|r ∈ R,A(r)∩ P˜p = /0}∪
{r : A(r)\ {Pp}⇒P C(r)!p|r ∈ R,A(r)∩ P˜p = /0}
>′=> \{(r,s),(s,r)|r,s ∈ R,A(r)∩ P˜p 6= /0}.
Then D≡ D′.
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Proof. The proof is by induction on the length of a derivation P; its structure is the
same of that for Lemma 20. We have to take into account the different proof conditions
for permission, and arrange the proof to analyse the inductive bases and steps of each
derivation either when Pp is a fact or not.
For the inductive base, we consider all possible derivations of length one for a
generic literal q in the theory, where Pp ∈ F .
P(1) = +∂Oq. From D to D′, the structure of the proof follows the inductive base for
+∂Oq of Lemma 19, where the cases depending on F are trivially satisfied since F = F ′,
and the other steps are obtained by substituting p with Pp and ∼p with P˜p.
From D′ to D, there must exist an applicable rule r proving +∂Oq at P(1) in D′. Then
A(r) ⊆ F . By construction of D′, the antecedent of r in D is either the same, or A(r)∪
{Pp}, while the consequent has q as the first element. In this case p cannot precede q
since a permission never precedes an obligation in a reparation chain. Since Pp∈ F , then
all rules in D corresponding to applicable rules in D′ are themselves applicable in D.
As already argued, also in this case if a rule s is discarded for ∼q at P(1) in D, then
either it is not in D′, or it is discarded in D′. In particular, all rules in R for which there
is no corresponding rule in R′ have either (i) ¬Pp or O∼p in the antecedent, (ii) ∼p
precedes ∼q if s is an obligation rule, (iii) p precedes ∼q if s is a permission rule. Since
+∂P p holds, clauses (1.1) and (1.4) of Definition 7, and Proposition 15 Part 3 make the
rules of the form (i) discarded in D. Moreover, the rules of type (ii) and (iii) are also
discarded since Pp ∈ F , and by Definition 7 clauses (2) and (3), respectively.
P(n+ 1) = +∂Oq. The proof is essentially identical to situation P(n+ 1) = +∂Oq of
Lemma 19. Notice that for rule applicability, clauses l ∈ F (condition (1.5)) and ck 6∈ F
or ∼ck ∈ F (condition (2)) are both true in D and D′, since the set of facts is the same
and it does not contain non-modal literals.
P(1) = +∂Pq, P(n+ 1) = +∂Pq. For the inductive base, notice that by construction of
D′, the antecedent of a rule r for permission in D is either the same, or A(r)∪{Pp}, while
the consequent must have q as first element. However, applicability and refutability of
this rule follow the analysis carried out for +∂O. We treat the inductive step as usual,
using the inductive hypothesis and the fact that F = F ′. In this case, we do not consider
rules of type (iii), i.e., rules for P∼q, since only rules for obligation can attack rules for
permission.
The hypothesis F = F ′ and the structure of D′ can be easily used to prove the inductive
base and the inductive step for proof tags −∂O and −∂P.
Both the inductive base and the inductive step for ±∂X q with X = {O,P} in the case
where Pp 6∈ F are straightforward. Indeed, even when Pp ∈ A(r) in D, the hypothesis
+∂P p allows an applicable rule in D′ to be also applicable in D. The same hypothesis
allows us to conclude that a discarded rule in D is also discarded in D′, and the other way
around.
Lemma 23. Let D = (F,R,>) be a theory such that F ∩Lit = /0 and D ⊢ −∂P p. Let
D′ = (F,R′,>′) be theory obtained from D where
R′ = {r : A(r)\ {¬Pp}⇒P C(r)⊖ p|r ∈ R,A(r)∩{Pp}= /0}
>′ => \{(r,s),(s,r)|r,s ∈ R,A(r)∩{Pp} 6= /0}.
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Then D≡ D′.
Proof. Condition D ⊢ −∂P∼l is another consequence of D ⊢ +∂Ol, as stated by Propo-
sition 15 Part 2. As such, the proof is derived by Lemma 20, where l =∼p.
Lemma 25. Let D = (F,R,>) be a theory such that F ∩ModLit = /0, ∃r ∈ RO[p,1],
A(r) = /0, and R[∼p]⊆ Rin f d . Then D ⊢+∂O p.
Proof. Given that there are no modal literals in F clause (2.1) of +∂O is satisfied. Let
r be a rule that meets the conditions of the Lemma. According to Definition 5, rule r is
trivially applicable for p in the condition for +∂O, and thus clause (2.2) is applicable as
well. Finally, for clause (2.3) we have that all rules for ∼p are inferiorly defeated by an
appropriate rule with empty antecedent for p, but a rule with empty body is applicable.
Hence, all clauses for proving +∂O are satisfied. Thus, D ⊢+∂O p.
Lemma 26. Let D = (F,R,>) be a theory such that F ∩ModLit = /0, ∃r ∈ RP[p,1],
A(r) = /0, and RO[∼p]⊆ Rin f d . Then D ⊢+∂P p.
Proof. The proof is analogous to the previous one. The differences are that we have
to use the notion of applicability in Definition 6, and that the rules that are inferiorly
defeated are restricted to rules in RO[∼p].
Lemma 27. Let D = (F,R,>) be a theory such that F ∩ModLit = /0 and RX [p] = /0, for
X ∈ {O,P}. Then D ⊢ −∂X p.
Proof. If there are no modal literals and the set of defeasible (obigation/permission) rules
for a literal p is empty, then clause (2.2) of −∂O and −∂P are vacuously satisfied.
Lemma 28. Let D = (F,R,>) be a theory such that F ∩ModLit = /0, and ∃r ∈ R[p,1]
such that A(r) = /0 and rsup = /0. Then
1. if r ∈ RO, then D ⊢ −∂✷∼p, ✷ ∈ {O,P};
2. if r ∈ RP∪Rde f , then D ⊢ −∂O∼p.
Proof. Let r be a rule in a theory D for which the conditions of the Lemma hold. It is easy
to verify that for both cases the rule satisfies clause (2.3) of −∂✷, in particular (2.3.2–3)
for −∂O and (2.3.2) for −∂P.
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